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Abstract
This article argues for setting a research agenda to investigate more concretely the 
interplay between welfare attitudes and support for populist parties. It notes that although 
much has been written about populism, much less has been written about the interplay 
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between populism and welfare attitudes. In addition, populism has tended to concentrate 
on rightwing populism while devoting less attention to leftwing populism. Meanwhile, 
centrist populist parties have been even more neglected than leftwing populism. We need 
to develop a more nuanced view and conduct comparative analyses of the differences in 
welfare attitudes among leftwing, centrist and rightwing populist voters. Our article also 
notes that the current databases that have both voting and welfare attitudes often do not 
include the countries with the most important leftwing populist parties. Another problem 
is the need to take into account the country context. For example, Podemos in Spain, 
Syriza in Greece and Smer in Slovakia are all three normally considered to be leftwing 
populist parties, but only Smer has promoted an anti-immigrant and anti-Roma agenda.
Key words: populism, welfare attitudes, political parties
If Marx were alive today, he might write something like “there’s a specter haunting 
Europe and that specter is populism”. In recent years populist parties have made great 
inroads throughout the democratic world. There has been a tendency to see populist 
movements as being “rigthwing” — such as Trump in the USA, the Freedom Party in 
Austria, the Swedish Democrats in Sweden, Berlusconi’s various parties in Italy, and 
the National Front in France. Despite this tendency to emphasize the rightwing populist 
parties, recently leftwing populist parties have emerged. This includes Podemos in Spain 
and Syriza, which actually came to power for a few years in Greece. In the post-communist 
world rightwing populist parties rule in such countries as Hungary and Poland, but in 
Slovakia, Smer has dominated the political scene for the past decade. Although some 
might consider its anti-Roma and anti-immigrant stances to be typical of rightwing populist 
parties, it is a member of the socialist bloc in the EU parliament and it considers itself 
to be a social-democratic party. Similarly, the Czech President Miloš Zeman has clear 
populist tendencies. Similar to Smer he considers himself to be “social demoratic” and had 
even previously been prime minister as leader of the Czech social democratic party and 
similar to Smer he has run anti-immigrant campaigns. So even though the literature on 
populism has mostly focused on rightwing populism, it is necessary to also analyze leftwing 
populism and compare the differences and similarities between these types of populism.
Since populist parties have come to power in some countries and have become major 
opposition movements in others, we would expect them to have far-reaching influence 
on the political climate. Social policy researchers, such as Svallfors (1997) have claimed 
that in modern democracies, class struggles have moved from battles over ownership to 
battles over welfare policies (e.g. Esping-Andersen, 1990; Ginsburg, 1992; Svallfors, 1997) 
as an expression of the distributional (class) conflict (Korpi, 1980). If this is true, then we 
would expect populist movements to also influence welfare policies as well as attitudes 
toward welfare among the population. 
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What is a “Populist” Party
If we are to discuss the interaction between welfare attitudes/policies and populist 
parties, first we need to define what we mean by “populism”. It is common to label 
parties populist if they pose themselves as representatives of “the people” against the 
“elite” (e.g. Gidron & Bonikowski, 2013). The people are virtuous and the source of the 
legitimacy for the populist parties (cf. Spruyt, Keppens & Van Drrogenbroek, 2016, p. 336). 
Populism pits virtuous and homogenous people against elites and dangerous “others” 
(Pogunkte & Scarrow, 1995) who are together “depicted as depriving (or attempting to 
deprive) the sovereign people of their rights, values, prosperity, identity and voice”. Thus, 
like other exponents of populism, entrepreneurial populists take aim at unaccountable 
elites and pursue a catch-all strategy by offering popular but vague proposals on a number 
of salient policy issues.
Populist parties do not have a clearly-defined universal ideology, such as Marxism 
or liberalism. Instead they are bound by the cultural context of the political landscape 
in their country (Arter, 2010; Gidron and Bonikowski, 2013). Consequently, their ideas 
cut across traditional ideological cleavages (Kaltwasser, 2014). Because of this, populist 
politicians claim to support policies in line with the interest of median voter (Acemoglu 
et al., 2011, p. 31). Due to this “lack of key values” populism is “particularly liable to the 
politics of personality” (Taggart, 2000, p. 101, in Gidron and Bonikowski, 2013, p. 13). 
Although populism does not comprise an ideology in the traditional sense, it still aims 
for the “thin center” (Mudde, 2004; Freeden, 1996; Stanley, 2008). 
Thus, even if populist parties only have a thin ideology, scholars often consider 
populism to be a specific discourse or ideology, where the key emphasis is on the tension 
between “the people” versus the elites, as well as between “the people” and the “dangerous 
others.” For those on the left, these groups are large business corporations and financial 
interests. For those on the right these groups are minority groups like immigrants, 
environmentalists, and feminists. Populism combines centralized organizational structures 
with charismatic leaders and the understanding of democracy as unmediated popular 
sovereignty (Zaslove, 2008, p. 323). 
Most of the literature focuses on the populist right, but populist movements cover 
the entire political spectrum. Zaslove (2008) distinguishes center, radical right, left and 
national populist parties. Mudde (2007) differentiates between radical rightwing populist 
parties (which oppose liberal democracy) and non-radical populist rightist parties (which 
accept liberal democracy). It is difficult sometimes to distinguish between radical and 
populist movements as they two groupings have a high degree of overlap. This is because 
the recent radical right and radical left parties usually no longer openly question liberal 
democracy and instead criticize the political establishment (Rooduijn & Akkerman, 2017). 
For example, Le Front National was usually considered a radical right party, but under the 
tutelage of the founder’s daughter, Marie Le Pen, the party has toned down its anti-system 
stance and is now usually considered more of a populist party with a thinner ideology than 
a radical right party, which had a thicker, neo-fascist ideology under Jean-Marie Le Pen. 
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The rise of populism is often tied to globalization. Some scholars claim that 
globalization and the breakdown of the post-war social-market compromise between labor 
and capital is the source of the rise of populism. If this is true, then the performance of 
the welfare state and the assessment of the welfare state by the public is one of the key 
triggers of this change. Taggart (in Zaslove, 2008, p. 324), for example, claims that growing 
demand for welfare benefits, raised expectations to such levels that government could 
not adequately respond to voters in an era in which governments felt forced to cutback 
government spending in order to lower taxes and therefore, compete on the global market 
for capital investments.
What is a “leftist” or “rightist” Party
If it is true that populists often have rather vague, “thin” ideologies and try to become 
“catch-all” parties that promise everything to everyone (at least to everyone belonging to 
the “in-group”), then it becomes difficult to decide whether a populist party is a leftwing 
or rightwing populist party. Even names are not clear. For example, to the extent that 
one might consider the Nazis to have been a populist party, their name included the 
words “socialist” and “workers’ party,” yet they are usually classified as being rightwing 
extremists rather than leftists. Since they actually had a thick ideology based on race 
biology, they are normally not considered to be populist but rather extremist. However, 
other parties that are usually considered to be rightwing populist parties often tend to have 
rather generous social policies, which make them somewhat “leftist”. This is true of both 
the Law and Justice party (PiS) in Poland and FIDESZ in Hungary. In both countries, 
the communist parties reformed themselves after the fall of communism and repackaged 
themselves as “socialist” parties. They joined the Socialist International and the socialist 
bloc in the EU parliament. Yet, while in power they often enacted radical free-market 
reforms including “liberal” kinds of residual social policies based on targeting and means-
testing. Meanwhile, the rightwing populist parties in both countries have introduced — 
or sometimes reintroduced — much more generous welfare schemes that sometimes 
are also universal in nature (such as child allowances in Poland). Since universalism is 
usually associated with social democratic welfare policies and residualist means-testing 
with liberal welfare states, it becomes difficult to label these populist parties as being 
rightwing or leftwing. 
Another problem in determining whether a party is leftwing or rightwing is the issue 
of how one should judge them. Should social scientists base it on what parties say — for 
example, by analyzing their election manifestos — or should they base it on what the 
parties actually do? There can be great differences as once in government one faces 
pressures to adapt policies to what other organizations (such as international creditors, 
business organizations, etc.) demand. As Syriza in Greece found out, even though they 
won the election on a leftwing, anti-austerity manifesto and even though they also won 
a referendum against the austerity measures that the EU wanted to impose on them, when 
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faced with the choice of leaving the Eurozone and perhaps even the EU, they balked 
and introduced the austerity measures that the EU demanded. Does that make them 
a rightwing populist because they changed their policies? 
In our opinion the best way to solve the issue of whether a populist party is left, center 
or right is to base it on self-placement. For example, even though one could argue that 
Smer in Slovakia supports traditional rightwing populist parties (such as being anti-Roma, 
anti-immigrant, nationalist, basically against universal and generous welfare programs), 
it considers itself to be social democratic, it joined the socialist international and is 
a member of the socialist bloc in the EU parliament. Thus, we would consider it to be 
a leftwing populist party, because that is how it packages itself. Then as social scientists, we 
can ask the question as to why a populist party claiming to be “leftist” advocates policies 
in Slovakia that are so radically different from what leftwing populist parties advocate in 
such countries as Germany, Greece and Spain. We can also analyze whether these self-
proclaimed leftist parties really support the types of policies that social scientists claim 
are typical of leftwing populist parties. In itself, it is an interesting outcome as to how 
self-identification differs from the attempts of social scientists to develop “objective” 
criteria for determining whether a populist party is leftist or rightist (or even centrist).
Right-wing populism and the welfare state
The main discourse on rightwing populism has concerned the issue of welfare 
chauvinism (e.g. De Koster et al., 2013; Emmenegger & Klemmensen, 2013; Van der 
Waal et al., 2010; Van Oorschot, 2000, 2006). According to this notion, supporters of 
rightwing populist parties consider immigrants to be “unworthy” of receiving welfare 
benefits. Those, who fare poorly because of globalization, tend to perceive immigrants and 
minority ethnic groups to be competitors. Their fears of competition for scarce resources 
increase when immigration increases (e.g. Lubbers et al., 2002; Arzheimer & Carter, 
2006). Rightwing populists play on this fear of competition and portray the ethnic majority 
as being good citizens, while immigrants and ethnic minorities are “undeserving” because 
they are “lazy.” They claim that these outsiders abuse the system to gain welfare benefits 
to which they are not entitled (e.g. Swank and Betz, 2003; Burgoon et al., 2018). 
Some studies, however, conclude that univeralist, social democratic welfare states 
depress the support for welfare chauvinism despite the increasing insecurity that 
globalization has brought about (Swank & Betz, 2003; Reeskens & Van Oorschot, 2013). 
The logic is that universalist welfare states encourage inclusiveness as everyone benefits 
from the policies. Consequently, it is common to think that everyone — regardless of 
background — has the right to benefit from social welfare programs. Means-tested politics, 
by contrast, emphasize the issue of deservingness, as targeted programs are supposed to 
only target the “deserving”. Thus, those paying taxes but not receiving benefits might 
doubt whether those receiving benefits really deserve it. Moreover, whether true or not, 
in countries with liberal welfare states, where most benefits are targeted, the boulevard 
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media portray immigrants or ethnic minorities as people, who abuse the welfare state. 
Another explanation is that social democratic welfare states reduce poverty and social 
inequality, which makes deservingness less of an issue.
The question is whether such arguments about welfare states still hold up, since 
rightwing populist parties have gain in support in recent years in the Nordic countries with 
social democratic welfare states. It the last elections in Sweden, the rightwing populist, 
anti-immigrant party the Swedish Democrats came in third place, receiving over 17% of 
the votes (Valmyndigheten, 2018). Meanwhile, in Finland the rightwing populist Finns 
Party also received over 17% of the votes (Statistics Finland, 2019) and just missed being 
the largest party in parliament by 25%. Meanwhile, in Denmark the rightwing populist 
Danish People’s Party also came in second place in the 2015 elections, but with 21.1% of 
the votes they were even more popular than their Finnish counterpart (Wikipedia, 2019). 
In the 2019 elections this populist party dropped dramatically to 8.7% of the votes, but the 
fact that it had done so well in the previous election still casts doubt on the argument that 
social democratic welfare states prevent the rise of rightwing populist parties. However, 
it does seem likely that they have helped prevent the rise of leftwing populist parties, as 
none of the Nordic countries have large leftwing populist parties in parliament. 
Other studies report that rightwing populist voters do not view ethnic minorities as less 
deserving per se, but rather they oppose giving more benefits to these groups because they 
allegedly display “unfavorable” characteristics (Koostra, 2016). Ennser-Jedenastik (2018) 
suggests that social insurance and universal social benefits (based on citizenship) lead to 
low levels of welfare chauvinism, while a high level of chauvinism arises for programs based 
on residency or means-testing. His findings confirm that the contribution-based elements 
of social programs are less likely to draw nativist criticism (for a similar conclusion see 
also Reeskens & Van Oorschot, 2013). This would still lead to the conclusion that social 
democratic and Christian Democratic/conservative welfare states dampen support for 
rightwing populism, since most benefits are based on contributions. Yet, as noted above, 
in recent years rightwing populist parties have done well in the Nordic, social democratic 
countries. They have obviously done also quite well in countries with conservative welfare 
systems, such as France, Germany and Austria.
Other studies have concluded that economic conditions and immigration have 
influenced support for rightwing populism. The traditional argument was that increased 
inflation and unemployment during the 1970s and 1980s contributed to the mobilization 
of latent right-wing extremist attitudes among the public — especially among those who 
lost out during the modernization processes (e.g. Betz, 1994, Kitschelt & McGann, 1995) 
and those who for any reason became unemployed (Jackman & Volpert, 1996). On the 
other hand, other studies provide contradictory results: unemployment does not exert 
the anticipated effect on potential vote support for rightwing populist parties. On the 
contrary, increasing unemployment actually decreases support for rightwing populist 
parties (Knigge, 1998; Lubbers et al., 2002; Arzheimer and Carter, 2006). The explanation 
is that when unemployment is on rise, traditional left-wing parties as well as mainstream 
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center and center-right wing parties develop policies for dealing with these issues, so 
voters turn to these parties rather than small oppositional populist parties (Knigge, 1998; 
Arzheimer and Carter, 2006). Furthermore, people in wealthy countries are afraid to lose 
what they have gained in times of prosperity (Lubbers et al., 2002), so they do not want to 
risk their gains by voting for populist parties, whose policies might threaten their economic 
well-being. New kinds of parties represent a risk if they have not yet been in power and 
it is difficult to gage what the results of their policies would be.
On the other hand, Golder (2003) claims that the level of immigration and 
unemployment influence support for rightwing populist parties, although these issues 
do not influence support for radical, extremist rightwing parties (such as fascist ones). 
However, the effect of unemployment of this support depends on the level of immigration: 
when the immigration rate is high, increasing unemployment leads to greater support for 
rightwing populist parties. Thus, Rygdren and Ruth (2013) find that in Sweden higher 
unemployment rates and lower average incomes lead to greater support for rightwing 
populism, because the socio-economically marginalized come into potential conflict with 
immigrants over scarce resources. This shows that socioeconomic issues can influence 
support for rightwing populism in social democratic countries as well as in liberal and 
conservative ones.
Leftt-wing populism and the welfare state
Even though most of the literature has dealt with rightwing populism, leftwing populist 
parties are also on the rise. In Latin America, leftwing populist parties have been more 
prominent than in Europe; consequently, there have been more studies about the Latin 
American cases. For example, Rodrik (2018) claims that while rightwing populism in 
Europe is based on the fear that immigrants will erode welfare benefits, in Latin America, 
leftwing populism is based on the fear of austerity programs. In these countries, they 
fear that international organizations such as the IMF will impose austerity programs 
enforcing welfare cutbacks, while pressuring governments to allow foreign companies 
to take over utilities and national resources. Although he acknowledges the existence of 
leftist populism, he sees it as mostly a Latin American phenomenon rather than something 
that has impact on European politics. 
Nevertheless, some recent studies have analyzed the rise of radical left-wing populism 
in Europe. These studies conclude that leftwing populist parties embrace state intervention 
in the economy, they claim to have socialist or social democratic principles, but also 
tend to oppose the EU’s austerity policies and engage in some amount of economic 
nationalism. They oppose a “neo-liberal Europe” but not a “social Europe” (e.g. Rooduijn 
et al., 2017). As Kriesi (2014, p. 370) notes, rather than emphasize the nation, leftwing 
populists tend to emphasize defense of the national welfare state against Europe and 
they want to defend “the economic privileges of domestic sectors of the economy and of 
domestic production sites”. Or as March (2007, p. 66) puts it: 
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Left-populists are “populist” in that the “moral people versus corrupt elite” dichotomy is central to 
their ideology. They generally have far less concern with doctrinal purity and class-consciousness 
than the traditional left. They adopt organizational features common to other populist parties 
across the political spectrum, such as the emphasis on a charismatic leader who has unmediated 
communication with his people and distaste for formal organization. Nevertheless, they are “left” 
in their emphasis on egalitarianism, and their identification of economic inequity as the basis of 
existing political and social arrangements. The espousal of collective economic and social rights 
for their chosen people constitutes their principal agenda.
Similarly, March and Mudde (2005, p. 35) write about what they see as the emergence 
of leftwing populist parties, which accept parliamentary democracy and have an anti-
capitalist profile: 
However, whereas traditional socialists’ egalitarianism and ‘proletarian’ anti-elitism might seem 
to lend themselves towards populism, their concern with doctrinal principle and the correct 
class politics did not. The social-populist parties are less overtly Marxist, and as concerned with 
extending their vote as constituency representation. They are populist in terms of juxtaposing “the 
moral people” against “the corrupt elite.”
Thus, similar to the rightwing populist parties, their ideology is “thin” and they support 
the “people” against the “elite.” Yet, in contrast to rightwing populists, they emphasize 
defending the national welfare state and egalitarianism. Similar to the rightwing populists, 
though, they oppose globalization. In the recent developments of welfare states, the 
window of opportunity for left-wing populism increased because social democratic parties 
have often supported welfare state retrenchment. Leftwing populist parties emerge when 
there is no credible left, as the left has been associated with communism (in Slovakia) or 
where the main socialist or social democratic parties become known for corruption and 
their market-oriented policies differ little from the rightwing parties (Greece and Spain). 
The voters of these parties hold leftwing views on social policies, but are disenchanted 
with the political elite. This leads to the hypothesis that supporters of leftwing populist 
parties will be more supportive than supporters of rightwing populist parties of general 
welfare policies. In particular they support government redistribution, redressing the 
privileges of the rich elite and the idea of social justice (Burgoon et al., 2018, March, 
2011; Ramiro, 2016; Rooduijn et al., 2017; Visser et al., 2014). 
When it comes to the country-level economic aspects, some studies have concluded 
that worsening economic conditions and high levels of income inequality increase support 
for the leftwing populism parties. The empirical evidence, however, is not convincing. 
While some studies confirm expectations a about positive correlation of unemployment 
and support for rightwing populist parties (March and Rommerskirchen, 2015), others 
provide different results. Visser et al. (2014) find that unemployment and GDP level is 
not associated with support for “social populists,” and income inequality is negatively 
correlated with support for such populist groups. The reason is that in the absence of 
a  strong radical left, concerns about income inequality are less prominent in public 
debates, so less support for leftwing populism emerges. In addition, the degree of social 
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mobility might be more important than income inequality in explaining support for 
leftwing populism. 
In contrast, Rooduijn and Burgoon (2018) document that immigration figures matter 
in interaction with individual economic hardship for voting for the radical left (including 
those parties classified as being “populist”): individual economic hardship only leads 
to radical left voting if the immigration level is low. Risk avoidance can explain this: 
since radical left parties are not very interested in immigration, the less well-off may 
perceive it to be risky to vote for the radical left when immigration rate is high, because 
they are afraid that immigrants will “steal” their jobs and welfare provisions. What is 
interesting in this context is that in Slovakia, the leftwing populist party Smer has played 
the anti-immigrant card even though the country has very few immigrants. In addition, our 
preliminary calculations that we have done for Slovakia show that there is no correlation 
at all between anti-immigrant attitudes and voting for Smer. In other words, it seems 
that Smer has run an anti-immigrant campaign despite the fact that there are not many 
immigrants so little reason exists to be concerned about this issue, and they have continued 
this campaign despite the fact that it does not seem to have gained them any votes. Yet, 
at the same time Smer had been the dominant party in Slovak politics during this decade, 
having been in power since 2012 (either in coalitions or by itself). Similarly, in the Czech 
Republic, the leftwing populist, Miloš Zeman, has been president since 2013, having been 
reelected in 2018. Even though he had previously been the head of the Czech Social 
Democratic Party and even had been prime minister as a representative of that party, he 
eventually left this party to found a new populist-leftist party that has consistently failed 
to reach parliament. Nevertheless, Zeman remains popular and won his reelection on an 
openly anti-immigrant campaign. 
Center Populist Parties and Welfare Attitudes
If it is not always clear what makes a populist party “leftist” or “rightist” then the 
category of “centrist populist party” becomes even more vague. However, there are a large 
number of parties, which experts have classified as being “populist,” which are neither 
clearly leftist or rightist. Just to take one example, Rooduijn et al. (2019) compiled a well-
known database on populist parties. They list of no less than 8 parties in Bulgaria alone, 
which existed from 2001–2014, which are indeed populist but neither leftist or rightist. 
It is not clear whether all the populist parties that are neither clearly leftist or rightist 
should be considered centrist and it is not clear whether centrist populist parties have 
anything in common with each other. Their particular stances on welfare issues probably 
depends on the political situation of their specific country; however, the same can probably 
be said about leftwing and righting populist parties. To give the example, ANO in the 
Czech Republic has emerged as the largest party with a clear centrist profile. We would 
argue that they did not emerge as the largest party because there was a demand for 
a populist party, but rather they emerged as the largest party because there was a demand 
for a social liberal party. Survey data indicates that the vast majority of Czechs have 
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social liberal attitudes (e.g. Saxonberg, 2003; Saxonberg & Sirovatka, 2009) in that they 
want a generous welfare state, but they do not trust the state to carry out policies and 
deliver services. Therefore, in contrast to social democracy, they prefer a system with cash 
benefits and private services. 
Contrary to what is often assumed, supply (i.e. political parties) do not always arise 
in order to meet demand (i.e. the wishes of the voters). Instead, what seems to have 
happened in the Czech case is that many centrist voters have voted for parties, whom 
they perceived to be a centrist alternative to the dominating center-right party Civic 
Democratic Forum (ODS). Thus, in the 1992 and 1996 elections they voted for the Civic 
Democratic Alliance (ODA); however, it turned out that even though the party was 
largely comprised of intellectual former dissidents, their actual policies in practice were 
even more free-market oriented than ODS, so after two elections, they disappeared from 
parliament. Then in 1997 the Freedom Union (US) broke away from ODS. Similar to 
ODA they were largely comprised of intellectual former dissidents and similar to ODA 
the voters perceived them as being to the left of ODS, but similar to ODA, their actual 
policies were even more market-oriented than ODS. So once again after two periods 
in parliament the party collapsed. Once this happened, a third party with a similar 
background emerged, TOP09, which was founded in 2009 under the leadership of the 
aristocrat Karel Schwarzenberg, who had served as foreign minister as an independent 
having been proposed by the Green Party. Similar to ODA and US the party had an image 
of being to the left of ODS and therefore, many social liberal voters flocked to the party. 
In the 2010 elections it received over 16% of the vote, becoming the third largest party 
and it formed a coalition government with ODS. Another party leader, Miroslav Kalousek 
(formerly of the Christian Democrats) became finance minister and carried out policies 
that were more market-liberal than those of previous ODS governments, despite the total 
lack of support for such policies among its voters (e.g. Saxonberg & Sirovatka, 2014). 
When voters started noticing that the party was actually to the right of ODS on economic 
issues, it began losing support, falling to 12% in the 2013 elections. In contrast to ODA 
and US, it has survived a third election and remains in parliament, but it has lost 2/3 of 
its original voters, receiving a mere 5.3% in the 2017 elections (https://www.volby.cz/). 
It is in this situation in which the majority of voters have social liberal values, but 
neo-liberal, free market values dominate among the political elite, made it possible for 
ANO as a catch-all populist party to emerge. It fulfilled the social liberal ambitions of the 
electorate by promising more generous benefits; yet, in typical catch-all, populist fashion, 
it also promised to do so without increasing taxes. Survey data shows that its voters do 
seem to share social liberal values, as they want generous welfare policies but do not 
consider themselves to be “leftists.” In contrast to rightwing populist voters, they are not 
skeptical of the EU, neither are they anti-immigrant. Their voters also come from typical 
social liberal backgrounds in that they tend to be highly educated and from the middle 
class (Heinisch & Saxonberg, 2017). So, it seems that it was the absence of a social liberal 
alternative on the supply side that made it possible for ANO to ascend to power, first as 
a junior coalition partner in 2013 and then as the major coalition leader in 2017. 
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Further Studies
Ideally, we would want to use the available international databases to conduct 
multilevel-multinomial analyses of who votes for different types of populist parties. 
The European Social Survey from 2016 presents the most recent international survey 
that includes many questions about welfare attitudes as well as questions about voting. 
Unfortunately, both Greece and Slovakia are missing from this survey, which means that 
the two countries, where leftwing populist parties have been in power are excluded. Given 
the fact that the number of countries in the survey with leftwing populist parties is rather 
limited and the two largest leftwing populist parties (Syriza and Smer) are missing, there 
are not enough cases to be able to make certain conclusions about what factors influence 
voting for leftwing parties. As often is the case in the social sciences, we have to do the 
best we can with our imperfect data. 
A second problem is that as noted, it is not so clear whether we really can group 
the different types of populist parties together. The country context seems to matter 
a lot. For example, Smer considers itself to be a leftwing, social democratic party, yet it 
shares a lot of common traits with traditional rightwing populist parties, such as its anti-
immigrant and anti-Roma stances. This differs greatly from the other most important 
leftwing populist parties, such as Podemos in Spain, Die Linke in Germany and Syriza 
in Greece. In addition, although ANO captures the social-liberal voters in the Czech 
Republic, it is not clear whether this is the case in other countries. Rooduijn et al. (2019) 
label Berlusconi’s parties as being neither left nor right. We would differ and label it as 
a rightwing populist party. In any case, if one would accept their classification, it would 
make Forza Italia a “centrist” populist party, but it is doubtful whether its voters share the 
same social liberal values as in the Czech case. Because no two countries are the same 
and no two political parties are the same, we need to simplify and use these wide kinds 
of classifications. However, since we clearly miss some important nuances, we should 
complement with country case studies. 
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